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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTRY CLUB FOODS, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, -
vs. 
GALE V. BARNEY, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case 
No. 9192 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant's retrospective examination of the evidence in 
its statement of facts will require a review of the evidence 
pertinent to the issues raised on appeal. However, no extended 
discussion of th facts will be made at this time save in the 
following particulars: 
Defendant, as he approached in an easterly direction 
the intersection of Third South and Sixth East Streets, was 
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watching to the South, and at no time saw Plaintiff's ve-
hicle until a second or two before the collision. Mr. Gale, 
Plaintiff's agent, looked at Defendant's vehicle twice, once 
when he was one-quarter of a block from the intersection, 
and a moment before impact; but he also noticed Defendant's 
vehicle by his peripheral vision as he was coming down 
the street, and as he entered the intersection. When Mr. Gale 
became aware of the imminence of a collision, he accelerated 
his vehicle and swerved first to the left, and then to the right 
to avoid an impact. Officer Williams, who investigated the 
accident, testified that Mr. Gale left slide marks, commencing 
at the intersection, which indicated· Mr. Gale had turned 
sharply to the left and then to the right before impact. The 
front end of Defendant's vehicle collided with the right 
rear of Plaintiff's truck at a point in the intersection where 
the front end of Plaintiff's vehicle was passing the southern 
edge of Third South Street. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT 
PLAINTIFF WAS NOT GUILTY OF ANY NEGLIGENCE 
WHICH PROXIMATELY CAUSED OR CONTRIBUTED 
TO THE COLLISION. (Reply to Defendant's Point 1 and 2). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT 
PLAINTIFF WAS NOT GUILTY OF ANY NEGLIGENCE 
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WHICH PROXIMATELY CAUSED OR CONTRIBUTED 
TO THE COLLISION. (Reply to Defendant's Point 1 and 2). 
Defendant states he relies upon the testimony elicited 
from Plaintiffs agent, Lavoy B. Gale, to substantiate his argu-
ment to Point 1, contending that Respondent's agent was 
guilty of negligence as a matter of law. It is fundamental that 
an Appellate Court may determine a question as a matter of 
law ony when convinced that reasonabe persons coud not 
disagree upon the question when conscientiously applying fact 
to law. Covington vs. Carpenter, 4 Utah 2d, 378 294 Pac. 2d, 
788. 
Mr. Gale testified that he was driving Plaintiffs one 
and one-haff ton Chevrolet Pickup in a southerly direction 
on Sixth East Street and was one-quarter of a block from 
the intersection of Third South when he first noticed the 
vehicle driven by Defendant. He estimated Defendant's ve-
hicle to be one-half block from the intersection, proceeding 
in an easterly direction. Defendant's brief states Mr. Gale 
did not look to his right again and proceeded into the inter-
section. A close examination of his testimony does not warrant 
such a conclusion. 
BY THE COURT: State whether or not you looked 
at all toward this car after you saw it the first time 
when as you say it was about a half a block away. 
A. Yes, sir, as I went through the intersection I looked 
and observed the car and that's when I took my 
decision to swerve and accelerate my truck. 
Q. Let me ask you then, from the first time that you 
noticed the vehicle until the time that you entered 
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the intersection, aid you observe the defendant's 
car, either through your peripheral vision or by 
looking at it? 
MR. KIPP: I will object as being repetitious. He testi-
fied that he did not. 
THE COURT: Well, I will let him answer if he can. 
A. I noticed the vehicle, like I say, prior to coming 
down the street. And as I entered the intersection 
and a moment before the point of impact, I did 
see the vehicle then. Accelerated my truck and 
swerved to miss it. (Tr. 21). 
Defendant's brief further assumes that Defendant had the 
directional right-of-way merely by proceeding towards an 
intersection on the right of Plaintiff. It is clear that the law 
of directional right-of-way will be invoked only when two 
vehicles enter an intersection at the same time (U~C.A. 41-
6-72 (b). 
However, the Trial Court well determined Plaintiff to 
be the favored driver, and such finding was substantiated by 
the evidence. When Mr. Gale was questioned regarding this 
subject, he stated on direct examination: 
Q. I see. Had you taken any precautions before this 
time? 
A. I didn't deem them necessary. I figured I had the 
clearance and was far enough ahead to make the 
intersection. 
Q. Were you able to determine which car had entered 
the intersection first? 
A. I was. (Tr. Page 16). 
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And upon cross examination of Defendant, the following 
question was presented to him: 
Q. Which vehicle to your knowledge entered the in-
tersection first? 
A. I don't know. (Tr. 26). 
And the Court made final determination regarding which 
party was the favored driver as follows: 
MR. BEESLEY: By way of rebuttal, I would like to 
put him on the stand merely to reiterate which 
vehicle entered first. I am not sure that was before 
the Court or not. 
THE COURT: Well, that, I think, was made an issue 
in the beginning. 
MR. BEESLEY: I believe that it was. 
THE COURT: Or, in other words, your witness testi-
fied that he was a quarter of a block away when 
he saw the other one a half block away and the 
testimony is that they were driving at about the 
same speed. So I guess that covers it. 
MR. BEESLEY: I won't have anything further then, 
your Honor. (Tr. 27). 
This Court has frequently enunciated the effect of the 
rules of right-of-way: 
"The right-of-way rules simply mean this: that if 
two persons are so preceding that if they continued their 
course, there would be danger of collision, the disfa-
vored one must give way, and the favored one may 
proceed; and the favored one may as~ume that this 
will be done." Coombs v. Perry, 2 Utah 2d, 381, 275 
Pac. 2d 684. 
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To be sure, the favored driver cannot totally ignore the 
other and blindly traverse the intersection, but until he is other-
wise put on notice, he can presume that the disfavored driver 
will slow down and permit him to pass. Concurring in the case 
of Bullock v. Luke, 98 Utah 501, 98 Pac. 2d, 350, 354, Mr. 
Chief Justice Wolfe said: 
'' * * * we must be careful not to stretch contributory 
negligence to the point where we make it encumbant 
upon one no tonly to drive carefully himself, but to 
drive so carefully as always to be prepared for some 
sudden burst of negligence of another, and be able 
to avoid it. * * * 
"Although plaintiff had the right-of-way under both 
rules above referred to, yet there devolved upon him 
the duty of due care in observing for other traffic. But 
in doing so, he had the right to assume, and to rely, 
and to act upon the assumption that others would do 
likewise; he was not obliged to anticipate either that 
other drivers would drive negligently, nor fail to 
accord him his right-o-way, until in the exercise of 
due care, he observed, or should have observed, some-
thing to warn him that the other driver was driving 
negligently, or would fail to accord him his right-of-
way. If this principal is not clear in the earlier Utah 
cases, it is firmly established by the more recent expres-
sions of this Court." Martin v. Stevens, 121 Utah, 484, 
243 Pac. 2d., 747. 
Defendant cites the cases of Bullock v. Luke, supra; Gren 
v. Norton, 213 Pac. 2d, 356; Conklin v. Walsh, 113 Utah, 
276, 193 Pac. 2d, 437; Sine v. Salt Lake Tran~portation Co., 
106 Utah, 289, 147 Pac. 2d, 875, to support the proposition 
that one is contributorily negligent as a matter of law for 
not seeing and avoiding the effects of another's negligence. 
Martin vs. Stevens, supra, stated in referring to these cases: 
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"Each of them was decided upon the proposttlon 
that the circumstances were such that the driver held 
to be negligent as a matter of law, either observed, 
or in the exercise of due care should have observed, 
the manner in which the other driver was approaching 
the intersection and clearly could, by ordinary reason-
able care have avoided the collision. Or to state it 
in other words, the negligence, or manner of driving, 
of the other driver was such that the driver appraising 
the situtaion was alerted to it, or by using due care 
would have been so alerted in time so that by the 
exercise of ordinary precaution, he could have avoided 
the collision. And, in each of these cases, this seemed 
to the Court so clearly manifest that reasonable minds 
could not find to the contrary.'' 
Plaintiff contends that its agent, Lavoy B. Gale, looked 
directly at defendant's vehicle on two occasions; first, approxi-
mately one-quarter of a block from the intersection, and sec-
ondly, a moment before the impact and that he also observed 
the vehicle through his peripheral vision while proceeding 
down the street. Assuming, for the purpose of argument, that 
plaintiff's agent saw defendant's vehicle only in the first two 
named instances, these facts are not sufficient or so clearly 
manifest that reasonable minds could not find to the contrary 
that plaintiff's agent was negligent as a matter of law. Mr. 
Gale took corrective action upon becoming aware of defendant's 
failure to observe the right-of-way, and the evidence does 
not justify that a conclusion that an earlier lookout would have 
put Mr. Gale aware of defendant's disregard to plaintiff's 
right-of-way in sufficient time to avoid a collision. Generally, 
the question of whether or not an action exercised by a driver 
is reasonable is a question of fact and should be determined 
by the trier of the fact, and even if the plaintiff were con-
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tributorily negligent as a mater of law, the question of whether 
or not such negligence was a substantial. causative factor in 
producing the collision is also one of fact to be determined 
by the trier of the fact. Hess v. Robinson, 109 Utah 60, 163 
Pac. 2d 510; Williams vs. Zions Cooperative Mercantile In-
stitution, 6 Utah 2d. 283, 312 Pac. 2d 564. 
In the case of Bates vs. Burns, 3 Utah 2d 180, 218 Pac. 
2d 209, plaintiff brought an action to recover damages when 
his vehicle was hit by defendant's coal truck. The jury returned 
a verdict for plaintiff but the trial court held plaintiff guilty 
of contributory negligence as a matter of law. Point No. II 
of plaintiff's appeal was that he was. free from any contributory 
negligence which either proximately caused or contributed 
to produce the accident. 
The collision occurred on Highway 91 north of the inter-
section of Third West in Pleasant Grove, Utah. The plaintiff 
was driving a pickup truck South of Pleasant Grove and stopped 
for a ~top sign before entering the intersection. He looked 
both ways and the road was clear, and he then proceeded into 
the intersection at a speed of five to six miles per hour. When 
plaintiff got past the center of Highway 91 and was nearly 
through the intersection, he was hit by defendant's vehicle. 
The court held that a party who first enters an intersection 
as authorized becomes the favored driver and all other vehicles 
approaching the intersection are obliged to yield the right-
of"'way to him. In setting aside the trial court's ruling that 
plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of 
law, the Court held: 
"In order to justify the trial court in upsetting plain-
tiff's judgment, defendant must prove that the evidence 
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showed with such certainty that all reasonable minds 
must so conclude, that plaintiff was negligent; and that 
such negligence concurred in proximately causing his 
own injury. We cannot agree that such a conclusion can 
be reached.'' 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff's agent, Mr. Gale, observed the vehicle driven 
by defendant as he approached the intersection and correctly 
assumed that defendant would yield the right-of-way to him. 
Upon discovery of Defendant's disregard to Plaintiff's right-
of-way corrective action was taken by Mr. Gale to avoid the 
collision. The evidence of record is not so clear that all reason-
able minds with certainty must conclude that Plaintiff was 
guilty of negligence as a matter of law. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BUSHNELL, CRANDALL & BEESLEY 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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